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ABSTRACT
The housing authorities of Boston and Cambridge are currently
spending over $100 million to rehabilitate four of the cities'
most distressed public housing developments. While each of
the redevelopment projects includes plans for resident employ-
ment, improved social services and other non-physical improve-
ments, the heart of these projects and by far the largest
dollar component is the radical redesign and restructuring of
buildings and sites. The model that the authorities are
proposing for turning around distressed developments is based
on their belief that substantial physical revitalization is
not only the most effective means for rebuilding the physical
fabric of these communities but provides an important impetus
and support for social changes as well.
In each of these projects, there has been an attempt to approx-
imate as closely as possible the image of a middle-class
development and to provide many of the most desirable features
of the single-family house. The physical changes proposed for
these developments are based on theories about the role of
housing in the life of the poor, as well as on practical and
political considerations.
This paper first reviews the forces responsible for the cur-
rent condition of public housing, in particular, the impact
of the changing tenant population. It then examines the
theoretical and political rationale for substantial rehabili-
tation as a means of turning around projects. In addition,
the paper looks at how the authorities resolve the equity
issues raised by investing so much money in so few develop-
ments, and examines whether or not these projects provide a
useful model for other authorities faced with distressed
developments.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley C. Keyes
Title: Professor of City and Regional Planning
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Preface
The best argument for public housing
is its permanence. The poor have
been driven away from almost every-
where except for the projects. The
projects sustain themselves. It's a
situation in which the pachyderm
nature of government-- its greatest
weakness-- becomes its greatest
strength in at least sustaining a
place where people who are poor can
live. We built on that to say not
only "Yes, you're staying," but,
"Yes, we're going to reinvest."
H.L. Spence, Court-Apppointed Receiver
for the Boston Housing Authority
And reinvest they have. Together, the housing authori-
ties of Boston and the neighboring city of Cambridge are
spending over $100 million to rehabilitate four of the
cities' most distressed housing projects. Their goal:
nothing short of creating developments which will be virtu-
ally unrecognizable, in either their form or the life of
their communities, as public housing.
At a time when the current administration in Washington
is seeking ways to eliminate high-cost, distressed projects
from the public housing inventory, the Boston and Cambridge
authorities are making an important-- and costly-- statement
that public housing is not only here to stay but can be made
to work in the very places it has failed most conspicuously.
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If these projects are successful, and there is good reason
to think that they will be, the Boston and Cambridge author-
ities will have succeeded at one of the most difficult chal-
lenges in public housing today: turning around distressed
developments.
Since the mid-1960s, housing authorities across the
country have struggled with the question of what to do with
severely distressed developments. Historically, plagued by
a multitude of problems from deteriorating structures to
violent crime, projects such as those undergoing renovation
in Massachusetts have proved highly resistant to even the
most well-intentioned attempts at intervention; a lack of
adequate and predictable funding has undoubtedly made the
task even more difficult. In the search for solutions, hous-
ing authorities have tried making management improvements,
modernizing buildings, providing improved social services,
even allowing over-income tenants to remain in the hope of
providing some increased project stability. Most improve-
ments, however, whether they are "bricks and mortar" or
improved social services, cost money, and money comes through
programs. Like most programs, those for public housing im-
provement go through cycles of popularity: one year there
is money for crime prevention, the next year money for
management. Given the traditional preference for visible
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results, there has almost always been some money for modern-
ization, but even that until recently could not be used for
comprehensive redevelopment. Inevitably, this piecemeal and
unpredictable approach to funding project improvements has
presented the most critical problems for authorities with
large distressed developments.
Because many of the problems of these projects are
systemic and mutually reinforcing, trying to solve them one
by one is a seemingly endless and discouraging task. Further-
more, many are not simply the problems of public housing but
are the problems of poverty. What role, if any, housing has
in creating or alleviating these problems has been the
subject of debate among housing reformers since the late
19th century. Unfortunately, the answers are not always as
clear as one would like, if only because housing as a struc-
ture is difficult to separate from housing as a symbol.
However, one thing that is clear, at least in the present
situation, is that the Boston and Cambridge authorities
believe that good housing can make an active difference in
the lives of public housing tenants. Although it may not
solve the problems of poverty, good housing can, at the very
least, alleviate some of the symptoms.
The four redevelopment projects in Boston and Cambridge
reflect the authorities' belief that the rebuilding and
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restructuring of public housing projects is the most effec-
tive basis on which to orchestrate their complete revitaliza-
tion. In addition, the striking similarities of the designs
proposed for these projects speak to the authorities' as well
as the tenants' belief that the physical form of communities
plays an important role in both individual and community life.
These projects are undeniably expensive--some might say
extravagant--efforts. There is, however, a strong belief on
the part of almost all authority officials and tenants that
without the funds for substantial rehabilitation, revitali-
zing these communities would have been impossible; if not
impossible, then, at the very least, an extremely difficult
and protracted process in which the risks of failure would
have remained high.
Whether these projects can provide a useful model for
other authorities with distressed developments is question-
able; the costs may simply be too high. However, if only
because the costs are so high, it is important to understand
why the Boston and Cambridge authorities chose this model,
and why they believe that it will be successful. What was
the authorities' rationale for spending what is, to almost
anyone's way of thinking, an enormous amount of money to
rehabilitate only four projects?
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This is not a case study of the four redevelopment
projects; nor does it pretend to offer a comprehensive view
of the policy implications of reinvesting in public housing.
Rather, it is an attempt to understand the four projects as
examples of a model for turning around large distressed de-
velopments. The model--substantial rehabilitation--is based
on the authorities' belief that physical revitalization is
the most effective cornerstone on which to rebuild not only
projects but communiLies. Why the authorities believe this
and why they made the choices they did is a function not only
of theoretical notions about the role of housing in the lives
of the poor, but a function of practical and political con-
siderations as well.
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Chapter 1: The Origins of Distress
All things grow old and housing
developments are not exceptions.
However, buildings as solid and
as soundly beautiful as the
Authority's can maintain this
youth almost forever. The trick
of this long life lies in one
simple word: Care. Nothing so
hastens the decay of materials
constantly exposed to the vagar-
ies of weather as does the lack
of paint. With the advent of such
decay, so departs beauty; so
begins slums.1
Boston Housing Authority
Annual Report 1950
The three Boston projects undergoing redevelopment,
Commonwealth, Franklin Field and West Broadway, were all
built within five years of one another as part of the state's
veterans' housing program. Completed in 1949, West Broadway,
or D Street as it is commonly known, is the oldest, largest
and only all-white development undergoing renovation.
Located in the Irish Catholic neighborhood of South Boston,
the project's twenty-seven nearly identical three-story
buildings originally housed 972 families. Commonwealth, or
Fidelis Way, in Allston/Brighton was built just a year later.
1 Boston Housing Authority, Report on the Activities and
Accomplishments of the Boston Housing Authority, January 1,
1950 to December 31, 1952 (Boston, Massachusetts, 1952), no
page numbers included in the report.
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Designed for 648 families, the project consists of thirteen
low-and mid-rise brick buildings. The smallest and last of
the three Boston developments to be built was Franklin Field,
located just south of the Roxbury line in North Dorchester.
Completed in 1954, the project's nineteen three-story build-
ings originally housed 504 families. The one project in
Cambridge, Jefferson Park, was constructed in 1950 as part
of the state's low-income housing program. The smallest of
the developments undergoing renovation, Jefferson Park has
only 200 units.
By the mid-1970s, each of these projects had suffered
severe deterioration. Heating and plumbing systems were
collapsing, vandalism and violent crime were on the rise, and
vacancies--an indicator as well as a cause of decline--had
climbed precipitously. At D Street, only 675 of the 972
units were occupied. Fidelis Way was over 50 percent vacant,
and at Franklin Field, only 375 families remained. The
developments had become "projects," the sort of places that
made people say that public housing couldn't work-- decaying,
dangerous, and marked by the despair of tenants who for the
most part had nowhere else to go. Inadequate funding, inept
and irresponsible management and the pressures of housing an
increasingly impoverished tenant population had taken their
toll--all in less than twenty years.
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This last factor is critical. It is impossible to under-
stand either the deterioration of these projects or the pro--
posed plans for redevelopment without understanding the
significant changes that have occurred, in most cases in
less than twenty years, in the population of public housing
tenants.
Both the system and the structures of public housing
were developed for a stable, working-class population, which
for the most part has long since abandoned them. Until 1949,
housing authorities were virtually unrestricted in their
tenant selection process. Only those who could pay the rent--
the working poor and the retired elderly--were accepted.
As one early Boston Housing Authority annual report explained,
"Public housing developments are not charitable institutions
for those who cannot or will not work. The rent must be paid.
There are no charge accounts."2 By and large, the authorities
were able to maintain a highly homogeneous, stable, working-
class population. Many of the tenants still had hopes for
advancement and a share in the American dream. Public housing
was a way station on the way up. As the Mobile, Alabama
Housing Authority's motto so proudly proclaims, there was a
belief that tenants could go, "From slums to private housing
2 Ibid.
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by way of public housing."
Managing and maintaining developments was relatively easy
as long as tenants could be handpicked. Rents were adequate
to cover operating costs and with relatively new buildings
and almost no problems of vandalism, routine maintenance was
almost all that was required. Furthermore, with managers able
to chose tenants whose values and standards of behavior were
similar to their own, there were few problems in enforcing
rules and regulations. Tenants were expected to behave, and
those who did not could be easily evicted. Developments that
today seem unmanageable because of their high density, small
unit sizes or poorly designed public spaces were once orderly,
well-maintained, and relatively unstigmatized communities.
Ironically, the Housing Act of 1949, which provided for
the public housing program's vast expansion, also spelled the
end to its era of easy success. Through provisions, which
gave priority to families displaced by the newly-created
urban renewal program and which prohibited discrimination
against those on public assistance, the Act ensured that
public housing would come to serve an increasingly impover-
ished and dependent population. With the postwar economic
boom and the northward migration of southern blacks, large
urban projects were largely abandoned by the working-class
poor to become little more than housing of the last resort--
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housing for the poor, the black, and the welfare-dependent.
Unlike the earlier tenants of public housing, many of the
new tenants had little hope of ever leaving.
This dramatic shift in the tenant population, brought
about by changes in the economy far beyond the control of
housing authorities, set into motion a mutually reinforcing
cycle of environmental and social decline that placed a severe
and often crippling strain on both the facilities and manage-
ment capabilities of many urban authorities. With rents no
longer sufficient to cover operating expenses, routine
maintenance procedures were often delayed indefinately at a
time when project wear and tear was dramatically increasing.
The physical configuration of dense urban developments, which
had been designed with an orderly and stable population in
mind, only made the problems of management more difficult.
As the project grounds, elevators and even hallways became
increasingly dangerous, most tenants relinquished almost any
sense of community responsibility and retreated behind closed
doors; the outside world was only one more reminder of the
lack of control they had over their lives. As many of the
once-orderly projects became places of disorder and despair,
the relationship between management and tenants became in-
creasingly bitter. In Boston, the worst housing developments
were virtually abandoned by the authority. In 1979,conditions
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had deteriorated so severely that the Massachusetts Supreme
Court placed the authority under its supervision and appoin-
ted H. Lewis Spence as Receiver/Administrator.
According to Spence, it was the breakdown in order, not
the deteriorating buildings or inadequate social services
that presented the greatest problem and the greatest chal-
lenge. The sixties and seventies were, "a time when there
was a great deal of confusion about values. A lot of us had
argued in the name of Progressivism that violence, loud noise
and disorder were all part of a valid life style of the poor.
I think that finally we're beginning to understand that what
we thought were middle-class values are, in fact, human val-
ues. Out of our confusion, however, had come a tendency to
say to tenants, 'You're not capable of living like the rest
of us; you live differently.' The tenants came to believe
that. I remember going to meetings at the beginning of the
Franklin Field project where people were saying, 'Why are
you doing this because we're just going to destroy it again.'"
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Chapter 2: Modest housing, perhaps.
Typical projects, hardly.
Faced with this tremendous despair, intolerably high
vacancy rates and deteriorating facilities, the Boston and
Cambridge housing authorities have responded with redevelop-
ment projects, which they hope will be successful not only in
salvaging buildings but in rebuilding these developments as
communities. In each case, the redevelopment effort is based
on the substantial and costly rehabilitation of the existing
facilities, or, as Pam Goodman at the Boston Housing Author-
ity (BHA) put it, "total redesign, total reworking and total
redevelopment." While each of the projects includes plans for
resident employment, improved social services and a number of
other non-physical improvements, the heart of these projects,
and by far the largest dollar component, is the radical re-
design and restructuring of the buildings and sites.
It would be a mistake to imply that the authorities have
simply applied identical solutions to the problems at each
development. However, the striking similarities of the pro-
posed projects are, in fact, far more important than the
differences for understanding what the authorities are trying
to accomplish.
In each project, one of the most significant changes will
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be the reduction in the number of units. Reductions range
from 12 percent at Jefferson Park, the smallest development,
to over 40 percent at Fidelis Way, where units will drop from
648 to 392. Decreasing the number of apartments allows the
authorities not only to increase unit sizes while still work-
ing within the existing building shell, but also to reduce
overall project density. By essentially creating new apart-
ments within the existing structures, the authorities are
also able to readjust the mix of small-and large-family units.
In this way, they are able to ensure that there are enough
large apartments where needed, while also making certain that
the number of children per adult remains within manageable
bounds at each development.
Not only has the size of units been increased substan-
tially, but many of the basic features have been changed as
well. Originally designed to meet minimum standards, the re-
designed units will feature far more so-called "amenities"
than most public housing units. For example, ample storage
spaces will be provided, some units will have entry ways, and
all bathrooms will have showers instead of just tubs. How-
ever, David C. Gilmore, project director for Franklin Field
was quick to add, "By amenities we're talking about closets
and closet doors, and space that is more functional. We're
talking about apartments that offer some privacy in a family
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that may have five, six or seven kids. We're not talking
about carpeting and dishwashers. It's modest housing."
Modest housing, perhaps. Typical projects, hardly. Once
completed, these developments will bear little resemblance to
most multi-family public housing. In each of these projects,
there has been an attempt to approximate as closely as possi-
ble, given the original project format, the image of a middle-
class development and to provide many of the most desirable
features of the single-family house.
Originally, almost all the buildings in these projects
were designed so that twelve of more families shared a single
entrance. By redesigning the unit layouts and, in some cases,
creating duplex and triplex apartments, the number of families
sharing hallways in each of these developments will be sig-
nificantly reduced. Many of the units will even have private
entrances and their own backyards--something almost unheard
of in public housing projects. At Jefferson Park, every fam-
ily, even those without direct access to the outdoors, will
have a private yard. It may not be immediately adjacent to
the family's unit or even to the building, but it will be theirs.
The project sites, now largely barren and covered in
asphalt, will be completely redesigned with grass, trees and
the sort of facilities usually associated with middle-class
developments such as: community centers; playgrounds; out-
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door plazas, and parking areas conveniently located adjacent
to the buildings.
Nondescript entrances will be replaced with attractive
front stoops where neighbors can gather. Streets will be re-
routed through the project sites so that each building will
have a street address. Some of the brick facades will be
covered with stucco. The list of changes is almost endless
and not so interesting except as a way of understanding what
the authorities are trying to accomplish. What is most
interesting is not to chart the long and often difficult pro-
cess by which the design decisions were arrived at--although
it undoubtedly makes an interesting story--but to understand
how these decisions reflect a set of theories about the ef-
fects of good housing on the poor, as well as both practical
and political necessities. Are the authorities simply pro-
viding tenants with larger units, private entrances and pri-
vate yards just because everybody knows that those
are nice things to have, or because the money happened to be
available? Or, do these changes reflect something more, some
theoretical notion that changing people's physical environ-
ment can have a significant impact on their lives?
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More Than Shelter
This program gives the citizen and
his growing children a new lease on
life. It produces better citizens,
happier families and enhances the
pride of its men, women and children
who enjoy its benefits, endowing them
with a greater sense of responsibil ty
to their government and fellow men.
Boston Housing Authority
Annual Report 1950
By the mid-1960s, the failures of public housing, if
not all the causes, had become painfully obvious. In many
cities, public housing projects were no better and, in some
cases, were even worse, than the slums they were supposed to
have replaced. The only difference was now that the slums
were under public management. For those who had never fully
supported the program and had always had their doubts about
assistance to the poor, the troubled projects were the only
proof they needed that money spent on housing for the poor
was money downthe drain. "The poor create their own slums,"
they said. "Give them good housing and they just tear it
apart." Even those who had traditionally supported the pro-
gram began to doubt whether it would ever again be the hopeful
program of social reform that had once been envisioned.
3 Ibid.
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Chapter 3:
Although by the mid-1960s, housing advocates had long since
abandoned any simplistic notions about the ability of good
housing to make good citizens, few abandoned the position
that housing had some, though perhaps unclear, role to play
in improving the lives of the poor.
While there had been a number of well-documented studies
which showed a correlation, if not a causal effect, between
extremely poor housing conditions and poor mental and physical
health, it remained much less clear what the effects of housing
were, once the problems of overcrowding, poor ventilation and
inadequate plumbing were solved. While the failures of public
housing seemed to indicate that the housing needs and require-
ments of the poor were different than those of the middle
class, it was still not entirely clear how they were different
and what to do about it.
There were a number of studies published during the six-
ties and seventies which argued that housing and community
forms were not merely aesthetic and public health issues, but
were, in fact, powerful forces in community life. They affec-
ted relationships between neighbors, influenced whether or not
residents would be victimized by crime, and in multi-family
housing, had a significant impact on project manageability.
While form did not dictate behavior, it undoubtedly was able
to influence it significantly.
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Other studies examined the more symbolic aspects of hous-
ing form and condition and proposed that how people feel about
their housing influences how they feel about themselves. Peo-
ple judge the quality of their housing not only according to
absolute standards such as the number of rooms but according to
relative standards, i.e., how it compares to their last house
or that of their neighbors. Housing has always been a powerful
symbol of a person's place in the world, and according to
these studies, it is a particularly potent one for the poor.
Substandard housing is a constant reminder of their poverty
as well as their inability to change their lives.
Still others looked at housing as a process and proposed
that people's involvement in building or improving housing
was as (or more) important than the final product in changing
their lives. It is a view which defines housing not only
as a noun but also as a verb--an active and potentially power-
ful force in people's lives.
Obviously, these three perspectives on the meaning and
effect of housing are not mutually exclusive. In fact, in
looking at the redevelopment projects in Boston and Cambridge,
it is clear that both the decisions and expectations of the
authorities have been profoundly influenced by each of these
views. What also becomes evident, though, is that the author-
ities' decisions are equally a function of available funds
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and political concerns. Theory only goes so far on its own
merits.
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The Form of Management
Oscar Newman's Defensible Space has probably had a greater
impact on public housing design than any other single work.
Based on his study of New York City housing projects, Newman
argued that architecture is not just a matter of style, image
and comfort, but is a critical element in encouraging and
discouraging criminal victimization. Why some projects were
safe and orderly when others were dangerous and seemingly
impossible to control was very often, according to Newman's
research, a function of their design. It was not that there
were more problem tenants or that the management of these
projects was more irresponsible, but simply that their design
had a significant impact on the behavior of residents and
non-residents alike. Crimes generally occur in places over
which the tenants feel that they have little control such as
shared hallways, elevators, stairways, open spaces between
buildings, and any other areas which by their design or
location are not thought to be anyone's responsibility.
"Defensible spaces," on the other hand, can not only be
controlled but, by their very appearance, give the message
that somebody is keeping an eye on what happens there. The
anonymity of many large projects makes them likely targets
for both crime and neglect. The solution, Newman said, is
- 23 -
Chapter 4:
to create spaces over which tenants can reasonably take
responsibility.
This is exactly what the Boston and Cambridge authorities
have done. Many of the improvements--the private yards, pri-
vate entrances, minimizing the number of families on a hall-
way, well-lighted and well-designed exterior spaces, to name
just a few--were expressly designed to encourage and allow
tenants to have more control over the project environment.
The more spaces that could be designated for an individual
family or for the families in a single building or group of
buildings, the better. Of course, this emphasis on private
property as a means of control and responsibility long pre-
ceeds Newman. Americans have always believed that ownership,
which is essentially control over property, has a stabilizing
effect on society. People who own property rarely revolt and
almost never burn down their own houses. Giving tenants a
stake in these projects would appear to be as important as
giving them spaces that are defensible. However, it is the
concept of defensible space to which authority officials most
often refer. "The more you can design to encourage the
participation of tenants, the better off you are," said
Bucky Putnam, Director of Planning and Redevelopment at the
Cambridge Housing Authority (CHA). "This generally means
persuading tenants that they actually control not only their
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own unit but the space immediately adjacent outside. The
further you can push that boundary, the better off you are.
Right now at Jefferson Park, you shut the door, because
that's all you can protect."
And right now that's not much, at least according to the
authorities who plan to increase unit sizes considerably.
With the exception of one bedroom apartments, the units in
these projects are small. In some cases, they are even below
the standards set by the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, whose standards have always been well below those
considered adequate in the private market. These projects
were also built in the early 1950s when the standards for all
housing were well below those most Americans have become
accustomed to in the last thirty years, when housing standards
increased dramatically.
However, the authorities have more than convenience in
mind in increasing the unit sizes. There is a firm belief
that the current size of the units places unnecessary pres-
sures on family relationships, many of which are already
strained by the pressures of poverty. Many of the units pro-
vide little privacy and are even too small to allow an entire
family to sit down to eat together. "Architecturally," said
Putnam at the CHA, "it's a system that begins to put a strain
on family relationships. When the units are too small, the
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kids drive the parents nuts and it's in everyone's best inter-
est that the kids get out in the hallways." Increased se-
curity and maintenance problems inevitably result as re-
lationships witin the units are strained and as children and
teenagers begin to extend their living space out into the hall.
Community facilities, even if they are provided, are not con-
sidered an adequate substitute. As one of the tenants at
Franklin Field said, "Community facilities are fine, daycare
is fine, but where as I supposed to live after these places
are closed? Give me a decent place to live and then we can
talk about anything else."
The authorities believe that once the proposed physical
changes are made, the projects will be easier to manage and
maintain. By redesigning the projects so that responsibil-
ities for the buildings and grounds are more clearly defined,
and so that activities within the project can be better con-
trolled, the tenants and the managers can each be held more
accountable for their role in making the project work. As
one authoritiy official said, "The manager can't just say,
'There's nothing I can do.' It's using physical design to give
the managers something that they can deal with successfully.
But don't get me wrong; it doesn't guarantee success." It may
not guarantee success, but they isn't anyone at the author-
ities who doesn't think that.it will go a long way towards
getting there.
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Unfortunately, no amount of redesign or restructuring of
space can solve the management problems confronting the
authorities at these developments. "Management is the chal-
lenge. It's the key to success," said Spence at a recent
conference. And, added Pam Goodman, "Building it is the easy
part." So, why not spend more money on management and less
on changing the design? There are two reasons. One is that
management improvements are not as expensive as they are
difficult. Both the authorities have, in fact, planned a
number of management changes; new managers have been hired
for some of the projects, and an innovative plan is being
tried at Fidelis Way, which will be managed by a private firm.
However, despite its importance, housing management has always
suffered from a lack of attention: unlike architecture and
planning,it has rarely been the subject of academic inquiry.
"There's no doubt that management has always seemed less in-
teresting, much less sexy than the bricks and mortar part,"
said Gilmore at the BHA. "You can see it by the kind of
people who are in it." Unlike bricks and mortar, however,
the old management structure can't just be torn down in order
to start all over again. "It's the hardest part of public
housing to make the management system work," said Bucky
Putnam. "We've gotten better at it, but how can you teach a
fifty-five year old man who has been working under another
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system for thirty-five years. It takes a long time."
The other and more important reason that the authorities
have invested so much money in physical improvements is that
without the "defensible spaces" and the larger, better de-
signed units, many of the management improvements would have
been more difficult to make. "You could argue," said David
Gilmore at the BHA, "that if the housing authority were will-
ing or able to have strict rules and regulations, and if
tenants could be evicted if they don't toe the line, then it
would be easier to have large concentrations of large fami-
lies in small units. To the degree, however, that you accept
the individuality of tenants and their right to live their
own lives with less oversight from the authority, you try to
make the most of their tendency to maintain and control what
they see as their own. That's part of the reason that you
see private entrances and yards."
The authorities have made a choice about management style
in the redesign of these projects. Had they been willing or
even legally able to exert a more stringent--or as Spence
would say, "authoritarian"--control over these developments,
it would have been possible (although much more difficult and
time consuming) to make them orderly communities with a much
smaller investment. Physical redesign costs money, but as
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Spence so correctly points out in discussing the redevelop-
ment projects, "The money makes it easier; the money always
makes it easier."
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Chapter 5; The Rewards of the Middle-Class World
It will make people feel better about
themselves. People don't think very
much of themselves now because they're
living in such bad conditions.
Janie Gibbs, President
Franklin Field Tenant Task Force
Whether or not a project can be adequately managed and
maintained is a function not only of the development's form
and the management's expertise, but also a function of how
the tenants feel about living there. Although it would be
difficult to prove a causal relationship, how people feel
about their environment is clearly related to how they feel
about themselves.
In America, good housing has always been an important
symbol of an individual's hard work, thrift and achievement;
to be poorly housed in America is somehow to have failed.
Public housing tenants have an even greater sense of defeat
than the poor who rent in private market. On the housing lad-
der of success, public housing tenants are undoubtedly stand-
ing on the bottom rung. "It's the stigma of living in
the projects," said Mike Jacobs, Project Director for D
Street. "Public housing tenants have a sense that they are
different, branded in a sense. Even though there might be an
apartment building next door with as many code violations as
some of our developments, the tenants feel that the family
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in private housing is somehow better, even if they have
exactly the same income. We saw no reason to continue stereo-
typing and typecasting developments as public housing. One
of the goals of the design was to reintegrate D Street with
the rest of South Boston. We didn't see any reason that some-
one should have to go by the development and say, 'That's a
project.'"
Both the image and the reality of large troubled housing
projects are a constant reminder to tenants that they are
different than other people, that they lack control over their
lives and that unlike other people, they are not capable of
making things better. According to sociologist Lee Rainwater,
Although lower-class people may not
adhere in action to many middle-
class values about neatness, clean-
liness and proper decorum, it is
apparent that they are often aware
of their deviance, wishing that the
world could be a nicer place,
physically and socially. The
physical world is telling them that
they are inferior as effectively as
do their human interactions. 4
Without a significant improvement in how tenants feel
about their environment, or, by extension, about themselves,
4 Lee Rainwater, "Fear and House as Haven in the Lower
Class," Journal of the American Institute of Planners,
(January 1966), p. 29-30.
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the Boston and Cambridge authorities realize that there is
little hope of making these developments decent places to
live. While the authorities could not be accused of naively
believing that this will take place miraculously simply by
virtue of changing the physical environment, they clearly
believe that without such changes, the process would be far
more difficult. It is a view which accords with that of
George Sternlieb, who said, in his study of welfare recipi-
ents in New York, "Improving the physical amenities of welfare
housing may not be sufficient to enhance the recipient's out-
look and life sLyle, [but] it probably is a prerequisite.
"II suppose," said Spence, "that if we're going to say,,
'We expect you to live in a manner which is consistent with
the way the rest of the world lives,' then it is important
that we also say, 'You get some of the rewards of that
world.' It's not fair to say, 'We expect you to live the
same as everyone else, only the shit we're going to give you
is twice as bad.'"
Of course, no one knows how much physical improvement it
takes to begin to change tenants' attitudes about their housing
5 George Sternlieb and Bernard P. Indik, The Ecology of
Welfare (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1973),
p. 218.
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or about themselves, or how important these improvements are
in comparison with job training or improved social services.
Although insufficient alone for turning around large troubled
projects, physical improvements are clearly important. How-
ever, unless they are significant enough to change the image
of public housing in the eyes of both tenants and the larger
community, they will probably do no more than add a little
extra comfort or convenience in the lives of the tenants.
More many not always be better, but less is often not enough
to make the needed change in the image, and hence, the
attitude about public housing.
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Chapter 6: "It's the process that sets everything
into motion."
While authority officials assume that the physical im-
provements will have a significant impact--both as facts and
as symbols--they emphasize that it's the process and not the
product of redevelopment that's most critical. According to
John Turner in his book, Housing By People, the act or process
of housing--the planning and decision making as well as the
actual construction--has a much more profound impact on
people's lives than the purely physical facts of new housing.
"D Street is not going to work because people believe in front
and back yards," said Mike Jacobs. "It's going to work be-
cause tenants believe in their ability to control their lives
and their community. It's the process that sets everything
into motion, not the design." Tenants come to believe in their
ability to affect change, at least partially, through parti-
cipating in the redevelopment process--making-the decisions,
struggling with the authority and with each other to come to
some common notion of what these developments should be like.
In each of these projects, tenants have been involved or
have been encouraged to be involved each step of the way. At
D Street and Franklin Field, the tenant task forces have gone
as far as hiring their own architect to help them understand
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and participate more fully in the design process.
The authorities believe that the tenants who do partici-
pate begin to feel that they have some measure of control
over their lives, and perhaps more important for the authori-
ties, some stake in the project's success. The projects
become not only the authorities' projects but the tenants'
projects, and, in time, the communities' projects. "It's a
process of community capacity building," said John Stainton
at the BHA, "and it's just as important as any of the physical
improvements."
Some people, however, have questioned whether some of the
most important physical improvements, such as the private
yards and private entrances, do not prevent a sense of commun-
ity from developing. The concept of community, however, is
extremely complex; communities can be based on a variety of
factors: location, kinship, and common interests, to name just
a few. One thing is clear, though, if only from the failure
of these projects. Community spaces have little to do
with creating community. While it may seem ironic, the
physical changes will undoubtedly work with--instead of
against--the process of community building. The sort of
communities, which the authorities and tenants are working
to develop, might best be compared to those in suburbia:
communities which act less as social units than as decision-
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making units. Suburban neighbors may isolate themselves
behind acres of lawn, but they come together to make decisions
that affect the entire community, for example, decisions about
zoning that affect who and what will be part of that commun-
ity. By having private yards and private entrances, the
tenants in these projects have made a decision to lead more
individual lives. However, these changes in no way prevent
them from making decisions about the community as a whole.
If anything, they work to remind tenants that they can in
fact control more of their lives than had previously been
possible. And control, perhaps more than anything, is what
is missing in these developments.
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Chapter 7: A Reasonable Investment of Limited Resources?
Despite all the enthusiasm surrounding these projects,
they raise a number of difficult questions, not the least of
which is whether they represent a reasonable investment of
limited resources. With severe reductions in almost all hous-
ing subsidy programs, it is not only a matter of whether these
projects make sense from a real estate investment point of
view, but whether they represent a reasonable or equitable
investment of limited resources.
Everyone agrees that these projects are expensive; together
they represent an investment of over $106 million to rehabili-
tate 1254 units of housing. Total redevelopment costs, which
include the costs of construction as well as those of reloca-
tion, administration and financing, range from $71,000 a unit
at Jefferson Park to $94,000 a unit at Franklin Field. "You're
locked into enormous costs,"said Bucky Putnam at the CHA.
"If you want to do it other than cynically, a renovation is
enormously expensive. There's no way around it. We could
have simply fixed up doors and the landscape, but in my
opinion that would have been irresponsible. It would give you
short-term political benefits, but the poor design that con-
tributed to the problems would remain."
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Even if everyone believes Putnam's argument--and it is one
repeated by most authority officials--that any lower level of
rehabilitation wouldn't have worked or would have been cynical,
it is necessary to ask whether this was the most cost effec-
tive way to rehouse the families in these projects. If not,
then what other factors besides costs make them reasonable?
In the eyes of the authorities, there were few choices.
The developments represent, despite their condition, a sub-
stantial investment. The authorities had to do something to
protect their investment or they had to get rid of it. Sell-
ing the projects would have been difficult both legally and
politically and would not have solved the problem of what
to do about the more than 1200 families living in them. The
authorities also believed that despite the Reagan Administra-
tion's proposals for a housing voucher program, there will
always be a need for public housing. Said Harry Spence,
"In truth, there are a lot of people in this society that
nobody wants to house, and you would have to pay huge sums
of money to get anyone to house them decently. There are so
many easier ways to make money. Something like public housing
always has to be there and there always has to be some sort
of production program."
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Assuming that there would continue to be a need for
public housing, the authorities felt that it made sense to
make a long-term investment; given the condition of these
projects, such an investment was inevitably expensive.
Fortunately, the state and federal funding agencies agreed
that substantial rehabilitation made sense. However, it is
interesting to note that three out of the four projects were
funded primarily under programs which, due to cutbacks in
Washington, no longer exist.
Like the authorities, the state and federal agencies were
interested in making a long-term investment. As one HUD
official explained, "Once the projects get into the sub-
rehab program, they have to follow the rules. The rules in
this case say that the project has to be built to last for
at least thirty years, because that's how long the bonds are
floated for. We're not going to have the money to come in
and fix it up along the way. Even though a job is basically
rehab, it should have the same useful life as new construction."
However, at least for Spence and his receivership, the
large dollar investment is not only important because it buys
improvements that will last for thirty years, but because it
buys credibility. For the Boston Housing Authority, that goes
a long way towards justifying the costs. "When we began the
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receivership," Spence recounts, "the displacement terror was
overwhelming. I got phone calls about every single develop-
ment with the exception of the South Boston ones. In the
city of Boston, there was enormous predatory intent with re-
spect to public housing projects. The tenants knew it and it
wasn't an irrational fear. You can't build a community out
of people who expect to be moved out tomorrow. The recon-
struction projects, then,hadan enormous political impact for
the residents, which is to say, 'Look, we care about your
developments. You're going to be here.' Investment dollars
are obviously the most meaningful statement that you can
make. It's the test of whether you're serious about your
statement of intent to sustain a community. In many ways, it
was a symbolic statement to say, 'We're not going to let
these communities go away.
The reconstruction projects are also a statement to the
larger community that public housing can provide decent hous-
ing for the poor. Said Spence of Fidelis Way, "We're going
to make this development work so well that no one can say
that the institution of public housing per se is flawed.
People will look at it and say, 'Public housing can work, so
what's the matter with the ones that don't.'" Of course,
public housing can be decent and is in many if not most places.
- 40 -
As a system, however, its failures are far more visible than
its successes; people don't notice the developments that are
decent precisely because they are. It's much easier to change
people's minds about the system by revitalizing several se-
verely distressed developments than by trying to point out
the projects that do work. Building things, or making highly
visible changes in the physical environment, gets attention
in a way that is difficult to do otherwise.
Whether the costs of these projects are justified as real
estate investments or political investments, they inevitably
raise questions of equity. How do the authorities justify
spending so much money to rehabilitate so few units--indeed,
to reduce the number of available units--at a time when the
waiting lists for public housing in Boston and Cambridge are
long and getting longer?
Almost everyone involved in administering these projects
has thought about the equity issue. The way most of them re-
solve it is by saying, as David Gilmore did, "The choice
isn't between the 504 units which were originally built at
Franklin Field and 350 new units. The real choice is
between 300 occupied units which are in substandard condition
and 350 new, fully occupied units." It's a strategy of cut-
ting losses and maximizing gains. Without redevelopment these
projects would continue to deteriorate, and the rate of
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vacancies would continue to increase. To do minimal moderni-
zation would only mean recreating many of the conditions which
originally contributed to the projects' deterioration. Look-
ing at it in this way, these projects are equitable because
there were no other reasonable choices; it was save some units
or lose them all.
However, for Harry Spence, there's another way of looking
at it. The projects are equitable because they bought his
receivership the time needed to take care of a number of other
distressed developments in Boston. "If we didn't do a couple
of grand, glittering showcases, the polity would have been
yelling and screaming that we weren't getting anywhere, that
we should just close down public housing. It was explicitly
clear that we had to do these projects as a way of getting
time and buying support." For Spence, spending a large amount
of money to rehabilitate only a few projects is equitable
because it has system-wide benefits.
Spence also makes it clear, however, that these may be
the last projects of their kind in Boston and probably any-
where. "It's not realistic about what the future is going to
be. We cannot continue to invest such a large sum of our
national wealth in housing-- not in private or public housing.
It doesn't make sense to argue that all public housing devel-
opments have to be gutted and redeveloped. If we did that,
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it would provide units of such luxury as to be an outrage
15 years from now when the waiting lists are getting longer.
Our housing standards as a nation are going to diminish. The
Reagan Administration has not been willing to tell the truth
about what's happening fto housing standards] except to the
poor. Now, if we were to have said to tenants, 'We care
enough about you to give you back your small homes,' before
anyone had begun to tell the truth about what was happening
in society, that would have been another demeaning statement.
I think that, in a funny way, our reconstruction efforts mark
a kind of statement of the integration of the poor into an
era that has just ended. And that's an important symbolic
statement because they were excluded from that."
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Conclusion: Lessons for the Future?
Whether these projects are symbols or political statements
in no way makes them any less declarations of the authorities'
belief that good housing can make a difference in the lives
of public housing tenants. While radically altering the
project environment may not make good citizens or endow tenants
with a greater sense of responsibility to the government, it
can make their lives not just easier but better. The authori-
ties may not be able to provide jobs or completely adequate
social services, but they -can, given adequate funds, provide
more manageable, more spacious and more attractive housing--
and that's what they're doing. Obviously, it's not enough
to simply change the physical environment, even radically,
but in the eyes of the authorities, it's the best place to
start.
Unfortunately, it's also the most expensive. Even if
these projects are successful, they will be costly successes
and for that reason, not easy to reproduce. As a model for
turning around distressed developments, substantial rehabili-
tation is a seductive one. Unfortunately, however, it pro-
vides few lessons for authorities who must attempt to achieve
the same results of order, project manageability, and tenant
satisfaction--with far less money. While it may not guarantee
success, money undoubtedly makes it easier.
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